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Foreign exchange market intervention in  
emerging market economies: an overview 
On 2 and 3 December 2004, the BIS hosted a meeting of Deputy Governors of central banks from 
major emerging market economies to discuss foreign exchange market intervention. While few 
developed countries have actively intervened within the last decade, the outstanding exception being 
Japan, intervention has been commonplace in the emerging market community.  
There are several reasons why developed countries no longer actively intervene. One is that research 
and experience suggest that the instrument is only effective (at least beyond the very short term) if 
seen as foreshadowing interest rate or other policy adjustments. Without a durable and independent 
impact on the nominal exchange rate, intervention is seen as having no lasting power to influence the 
real exchange rate and thus competitive conditions for the tradable sector. A second reason is that 
large-scale intervention can undermine the stance of monetary policy. A third reason is that private 
financial markets have enough capacity to absorb and manage shocks - so that there is no need to 
“guide” the exchange rate. 
Yet emerging market countries do intervene - presumably because they believe the instrument to be 
an effective tool in the circumstances and for the situations they face. The difference in view is brought 
home by the unprecedented scale of foreign exchange reserve accumulation by the emerging market 
group in recent years. Between the end of 2001 and the end of 2004, global foreign exchange 
reserves grew by over US$  1600  billion, reflecting reserve accumulation by emerging market 
economies in Asia. Many observers from developed economies have publicly attributed the 
comparatively weak appreciation of Asian currencies against a rapidly depreciating US dollar to such 
intervention. Hence there does seem to be a common belief that intervention by emerging market 
economies has significantly altered the path of the real exchange rate for long enough to matter - even 
if such a view runs counter to received wisdom about intervention in the markets for major currencies. 
This meeting threw some new light on these issues. Some flavour of the discussion can be gleaned 
from the central bank papers reproduced in this volume, along with overview papers prepared by BIS 
staff. Four central questions are outlined below; it will be clear that many important issues remain to be 
resolved. 
Is intervention more effective in emerging markets? 
The wide range of different objectives behind intervention in practice makes assessment 
difficult - especially empirical assessment that uses data from different episodes and different 
countries where policy objectives may vary. In flexible exchange rate cases, the objectives of 
intervention are particularly varied, a point which emerges clearly from the Moreno paper and the 
individual country papers in this volume. Reasons for intervention cited by central banks that do not 
target the exchange rate include: to slow the rate of change of the exchange rate; to dampen 
exchange rate volatility (in some cases to satisfy an inflation target); to supply liquidity to the forex 
market; or to influence the level of foreign reserves. The paper from South Africa provides an example 
of objectives that are both subsidiary to the main objective and conditional on prevailing circumstances 
(in this case, the process of reserve accumulation being used to help dampen volatility when that is 
convenient). Other country papers show that varying mixtures of objectives are quite commonplace. 
Many central banks would argue that their main aim is to limit exchange rate volatility rather than to 
meet a specific target for the level of the exchange rate. Yet others would counter that it is better to 
abstain from intervention in the foreign exchange market: such a stance would, they contend, make 
investors more aware of the need to hedge their own exposures, and this would help the market in 
hedging instruments to develop. The papers from Israel, Mexico, Poland and Thailand are particularly 
relevant in this regard. There is indeed some evidence that exchange rate volatility has fallen a lot in 
some countries where the central bank has not intervened in recent years. The papers from Korea and 
Peru highlight the existence of a policy trade-off where there are reasons to intervene to dampen 
volatility yet intervention may involve moral hazard with respect to market development. 
The survey reported in Mihaljek’s paper shows that many emerging market central banks view 
intervention as effective in influencing the exchange rate consistent with their objectives. Part of this 
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a regime, monetary policy actions are primarily dictated by what is needed to achieve and maintain the 
exchange rate target, intervention in the foreign exchange market is automatic or nearly so, and the 
exchange rate peg has proved reasonably durable. The papers from Hong Kong SAR and Saudi 
Arabia illustrate the point. 
Formal econometric research has usually thrown doubt on the conclusion of effectiveness of 
intervention in flexible exchange rate cases although, as noted, such research often conflates 
interventions for different purposes. In addition, the effectiveness of intervention is likely to depend on 
the specific circumstances - studies of effectiveness on average do not answer the question of when 
intervention is likely to be successful. 
Disyatat and Galati’s paper surveys the available empirical evidence, and presents new evidence for 
the Czech koruna (the methodology requires detailed daily data on intervention and option prices, 
which were only available for the Czech Republic). The authors’ new estimates tentatively suggest the 
existence of a cumulative effect from repeated intervention (although the mechanism is not clear). In 
the group of countries surveyed, there are several examples of repeated interventions over lengthy 
periods. In this connection, the paper from Venezuela makes the interesting point that intervention 
might have diminishing power with repetition. 
It remains possible that greater apparent effectiveness of intervention in emerging market cases 
simply reflects different structural characteristics. Emerging market economies tend to have less 
substitutability of assets across currency boundaries, and the authorities tend to have greater 
financial - and certainly regulatory - weight relative to their private markets. Mihaljek’s paper shows 
clearly that emerging market economies typically hold very large reserves compared with market 
turnover (see Table A2), even if interventions are not in general large relative to turnover. And several 
of the country papers describe the application of regulatory measures to obtain influence over the 
exchange rate. 
How much transparency is desirable in forex intervention? 
Typically, exchange rate and intervention policy involves some consultation between the government 
and the central bank. But there is no simple rule for allocating responsibilities between these two 
entities. As the paper by Moser-Boehm makes clear, views of central banks also differ about 
transparency. Transparency is seen as needed for accountability, which is more important the more 
autonomous the central bank. In some cases, high levels of transparency have also been used as a 
means of reinforcing a break from past exchange rate regimes and as part of an attempt to rebuild 
credibility. The papers from Argentina, Chile and Turkey all make such a point. 
Many favour transparency regarding the intervention framework ex  ante, and transparency about 
actual intervention operations ex post. For tactical reasons, however, silence regarding the timing and 
precise nature and size of specific operations ex ante is generally thought to be desirable (one 
exception is Hong Kong, where operations are revealed in real time). Intervention is sometimes kept 
secret so that the market has no target to attack - the paper from Hungary provides an account of 
open interventions attracting destabilising speculation - or has no idea of how much intervention has 
taken place so that credibility is not threatened by the perception that the central bank has failed. 
Some argue that markets eventually find out and secret intervention of this type is undesirable. 
Have intervention tactics improved? 
Central banks have probably improved their intervention techniques in recent years. They now devote 
greater resources to “reading” the market than in the past. But it is unclear whether central banks have 
become more effective as a result, because the sophistication of market participants has also risen 
and because the knowledge of what drives the exchange rate is still very imperfect. The paper by 
Archer examines tactical issues in some depth. 
The outcome of various intervention tactics depends on the situation, and tactics evolve as part of an 
ongoing trial-and-error process reflecting uncertainty about what works. Few felt that “clever” use of 
market dynamics (eg entering the market when it is known to be illiquid) to leverage the influence of 
interventions would be useful in practice. Most have an aversion to volatility, and would not like to add 
to it. Some would not like to be visible in the market at all, and the central bank’s presence is harder to 
hide when operating in thin markets. Others felt that having a large effect in a peripheral part of the 
market would be unlikely to generate useful results in the main (spot, wholesale, onshore) market. In BIS Papers No 24  3
 
any case, if a central bank wants to be effective in the main market, it should intervene in that market 
for reasons of credibility. 
The idea that intervention might work by “coordinating” otherwise dispersed or fragile views about the 
exchange rate outlook is also discussed in the paper by Archer. If that coordination channel is 
operating, it seems likely that actions rather than words are the main coordinating vehicle, given that 
only a small minority of participating central banks reported actively using “open mouth operations”. 
However, the papers from Chile and Indonesia provide interesting counter-examples where open 
mouth operations of quite different forms have been seen to be successful in influencing exchange 
rate behaviour. 
How decisive are adverse domestic spillovers? 
Resisting currency appreciation through large-scale and prolonged sterilised intervention creates 
several major challenges - for the stance of monetary policy; for the financing costs of the authorities; 
and for exposures in both financial markets and the public sector’s balance sheet. Possible adverse 
spillovers are addressed in the paper by Mohanty and Turner and by a number of the contributed 
papers (see especially the discussions of the relationship between foreign exchange market 
intervention and inflation targeting in the papers from Brazil, Colombia, the Czech Republic and 
New Zealand). 
Such domestic spillovers seem likely to make intervention harder and harder to sustain. Seeking to 
both prevent currency appreciation and hold up domestic money market rates (for monetary policy 
reasons) perpetuates the initial interest rate differential and can lead to continuous capital inflows. 
There is a risk of significant balance sheet mismatches for central banks, which could face losses due 
to carrying costs (if local interest rates were above foreign levels) or to their exposure to large currency 
appreciation. But although the factors that could at some point undermine the sustainability of 
intervention are clear, there are few signs at present that these adverse consequences have actually 
materialised. 
A number of features of the current situation thus seem new, with interesting implications. Large-scale 
sterilisation operations are clearly much less hampered by financial market underdevelopment than 
was the case just a few years ago. And even with incomplete sterilisation, the relative lack of adverse 
consequences raises the distinct possibility of longer-lasting real exchange rate effects of intervention 
than conventional wisdom thought likely. Just how long-lasting such effects really are cannot be known 
until the present episode has run its course. 